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Abstract
Low inflation is not perceived as a potential threat to determinacy and macroeconomic stability.
Should the Fed return to a rules-based monetary policy, the prospect of indeterminacy would be
particularly acute if the Fed adopted a mixed policy rule with the nominal interest rate responding
to the output gap and output growth. This is true for a rate of inflation as low as that observed on
average since the early 1990s. This finding contrasts sharply with the existing literature where the
threat of indeterminacy was high before 1983 and almost nonexistent afterwards. Key to our result
is a strong interaction between low trend inflation, sticky wages and technological trend growth.
Accounting for a cost channel of monetary policy and a roundabout production process increases
the threat of indeterminacy under low inflation. When removing the output gap or output growth
from the mixed rule, we find that a rule responding to output growth sharply widens the scope
for stability. By stark contrast, the results obtained under a rule reacting to the output gap only
essentially mimic those with the mixed rule.
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1 Introduction
“In many conversations with central bankers I hear nostalgia for what they call normal
policy times, and I have urged policy makers to renormalize rather than a new-normalize
policy—to return to a rules-based monetary strategy as soon as possible.”
—John B. Taylor (2015)
Faced with a near decade of unconventional monetary policy stuck at the Zero Lower Bound
(ZLB) on nominal interest rates, a number of economists including Volcker (2014), Calomiris,
Ireland, and Levy (2015), Ireland and Levy (2017), and Taylor (2015) have recommended that the
Fed should return to more conventional rules-based monetary policy many believe has contributed
to greater macroeconomic stability from 1983 to the onset of the Great Recession. The premise
behind this proposal is that implementing a rule-based policy will signal the Fed’s intention to go
back to a comprehensible strategy of communicating to the public the rationale behind its policy
actions and explaining the relationship between these actions and its main objectives. These two
elements presumably played a key role in achieving macroeconomic stability during the so-called
Great Moderation.
The merits of a rule-based monetary policy is also indirectly supported by the recent works
of Wu and Xia (2016), Wu and Zhang (2017) and Debortoli, Gal´ı, and Gambetti (2018), who
offer evidence in favor of the hypothesis of “perfect substitutability” between conventional and
unconventional monetary policies. This hypothesis holds that unconventional policy when the
ZLB binds produced outcomes that resemble rules-based policy in the pre-ZLB period.1 Therefore,
unconventional monetary policy at the ZLB would more or less mimic conventional monetary policy
with the Fed following a Taylor rule without the ZLB.
To ease the return to rules-based policy, Blanchard, Dell’Ariccia, and Mauro (2010), Ball (2013)
and Krugman (2014) have advocated for a moderate increase in the inflation target between 3%
and 4%. Likewise, implementing this proposal would raise inflation and interest rates on average.
According to conventional wisdom, a level of trend inflation of 3-4% should not represent a threat
to determinacy and macroeconomic stability more generally.
In the standard textbook New Keynesian (NK) model, a rule-based monetary policy set in com-
pliance with the Taylor principle guarantees a unique rational expectations equilibrium (REE).2
The Taylor principle works well in such a context because higher interest rates lower inflation by
1We do not have in normal times the counterfactual that the Fed followed unconventional policies with an outcome
similar to the Great Moderation.
2By standard or textbook NK model, we mean one with sticky prices, no capital accumulation and zero steady-
state inflation.
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curtailing aggregate spending. Yet, Christiano, Trabandt, and Walentin (2011) uncover an intrigu-
ing result: when the standard NK model is modified to account for two theoretical refinements,
namely the potential significance of a cost channel for monetary policy and a roundabout produc-
tion structure (Basu, 1995), complying with the Taylor principle no more guarantees a unique REE.
The reason for this is that working capital implies a direct impact of the nominal interest rate on
real marginal costs, while roundabout production exacerbates this effect.
Contrasting with conventional wisdom, we show that a monetary policy set in accordance with
a Taylor rule widely used in the recent literature can pose a threat to determinacy even at a level
of trend inflation close to the average U.S. rate of inflation since the early 1990s. To make this key
point, we use an expanded version of the medium-scale New Keynesian (MSNK) model proposed by
Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005). Therefore, our framework includes Calvo-style nominal
wage and price rigidities, and real adjustment frictions like consumer habit formation, investment
adjustment costs and variable capital utilization.
To this relatively standard MSNK framework, we add trend growth in neutral and investment-
specific technical progress (e.g. see Smets and Wouters, 2007; Justiniano and Primiceri, 2008;
Justiniano, Primiceri, and Tambalotti, 2010, 2011), a cost channel, roundabout production, posi-
tive trend inflation and an inertial Taylor rule. Furthermore, to the difference of Christiano and
Eichenbaum (1992), Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1997, 2005) and Ravenna and Walsh
(2006), who assume that working capital is needed to finance the wage bill, firms in our model use
intra-period loans to finance their outlays of intermediate inputs, labor and capital services.3 Using
this framework, we identify conditions leading to (in)determinacy at low levels of trend inflation
between 0 and 3% for different specifications of rules-based monetary policy. We show that the
prospect of (in)determinacy depends critically on the choice of theoretical ingredients and policy
rules assumed in the simulations.
There is no consensus about the exact specification of a policy rule followed by the Fed during
the postwar period. The policy rule in the textbook NK model says that interest rates adjust to
inflation and the level of the output gap, with the output gap defined as the difference between
actual output and the level of output under flexible nominal wages and prices (Gal´ı, 2008, Ch. 3).
Still, another rule widely used in the estimation of MSNK models after Smets and Wouters (2007)
says that interest rates react to deviations of inflation from a steady-state target, to the output
3Other examples of models where working capital serves to finance more factor payments than simply the wage bill
include Chowdhury, Hoffmann, and Schabert (2006), Christiano, Trabandt, and Walentin (2011), Ascari, Phaneuf,
and Sims (2018) and Phaneuf, Sims, and Victor (2018)
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gap and to output growth. The central bank also smooths movements in interest rates. We call
this particular policy rule the mixed rule.4
In Smets and Wouters (2007), the mixed rule ensures determinacy over the entire postwar period
and two subsamples which are 1966:I-1979:II and 1984:I-2004:IV. This is in contrast to Clarida,
Gal´ı, and Gertler (2000) and Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2011), who show that the U.S. economy
was in a state of indeterminacy prior to 1980, and in a determinate state after 1982. Two reasons
possibly explain these differences. First, Smets and Wouters report estimates showing that the
Fed’s response to inflation was active (coefficient on inflation greater than 1) in the two subperiods.
By contrast, Clarida, Gal´ı, and Gertler (2000) and Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2011) report that
the response to inflation was passive (coefficient on inflation between 0 and 1) prior to 1980 and
active after 1982. Second, concomitantly to using the mixed rule, Smets and Wouters assume
automatic indexation of non-reoptimized wages and prices to the last quarter’s rate of inflation and
steady-state inflation, making trend inflation and trend growth irrelevant for equilibrium dynamics
to a first-order approximation and thus neutralizing the impact of positive trend inflation.
However, the indexation assumption has been the object of criticisms (Woodford, 2007; Cogley
and Sbordone, 2008; Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan, 2009; Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Trabandt,
2016) One is that it lacks microeconomic foundations. Another is that it counterfactually im-
plies that all wages and prices in the economy change every three months, something which is
inconsistent with micro studies on wage and price adjustments (Bils and Klenow, 2004; Nakamura
and Steinsson, 2008; Eichenbaum, Jaimovich, and Rebelo, 2011; Barattieri, Basu, and Gottschalk,
2014). Moreover, Phaneuf, Sims, and Victor (2018) show that a model without indexation better
accounts for VAR evidence about the inflation responses to monetary and non-monetary shocks
than one with indexation. Also, Ascari, Phaneuf, and Sims (2018) provide a comprehensive survey
of the evidence from micro data on wage indexation in the U.S. and European countries. They find
that indexation is essentially absent from the data, a conclusion which also reached by Barattieri,
Basu, and Gottschalk (2014) based on U.S. micro data. For these reasons, we omit indexation from
our model.
We explore the conditions leading to determinacy under low trend inflation assuming four
different specifications of the Taylor rule. The first specification is the mixed Taylor rule described
above. The second one is a Taylor rule responding to the level of the output gap but not to output
growth. The third is a rule reacting to output growth but not to the output gap. Finally, the
4See also Justiniano, Primiceri, and Tambalotti (2010, 2011) and Khan and Tsoukalas (2011, 2012). The mixed
rule is also used by Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2011) to identify sources of (in)determinacy during the postwar U.S.
period, and by Coibion, Gorodnichenko, and Wieland (2012) to study optimal inflation rate in the NK model.
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fourth is the mixed rule with an interest rate smoothing of order two estimated by Coibion and
Gorodnichenko (2011).
Our strategy is to search for the minimum response of interest rates to deviations of inflation
from target, denoted as αpi, consistent with a unique Rational Expectations Equilibrium (REE).
Our baseline calibration assumes parameter values of the policy rule consistent with estimates
generally found in the empirical literature, with the exception of course of αpi which we search
for. The average waiting time between wage and price adjustments is set at 9 months, although
we also assess the sensitivity of our results to varying the degrees of nominal rigidities. The share
of intermediate inputs into gross output is 0.5, while the fraction of factor payments financed by
working capital ranges from 0 to 1.
We first examine the conditions leading to (in)determinacy when using the mixed rule. We
find that without working capital, the smallest value of αpi consistent with determinacy is 1.3 for
an inflation trend of 0, 1.9 for a trend inflation of 2%, and 2.5 for a trend of 3%. With low trend
inflation, these represent relatively large deviations from the Taylor principle. With a fraction
of factor payments financed by working capital equal to 1/2, the smallest αpi consistent with a
unique REE increases to 1.6 with zero trend inflation, to 2.3 with 2% trend inflation and 2.9 with
a 3% trend. With all factor payments financed by working capital, we find no response to inflation
consistent with determinacy.
These findings raise the following question: What are the key features of our model driving these
findings? We show that with a fraction of factor payments financed by working capital of 0 and 1/2,
the main factors driving our indeterminacy results are non-zero trend inflation, sticky wages and
trend growth. With flexible nominal wages and no economic growth, we find that indeterminacy
can be prevented for αpi values lower than the estimates generally found in the literature for a trend
inflation of 2% and 3%. If we further remove working capital and roundabout production from the
model, we then find that determinacy can be achieved with a weakly active (near one) response
of interest rates to inflation. Therefore, the more distant a particular model is from our baseline
framework, the closer to the Taylor principle are the conditions leading to determinacy.
The interaction between trend inflation and sticky wages is criticial for our findings because
households with positive long-run inflation would like to reset their wages each period, but only
a fraction can. This leads to significant steady-state wage dispersion, driving a wedge between
aggregate labor supply and demand. It also leads to higher wage markups on average, as updating
households choose higher wages than they otherwise would to protect their future real wages from
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inflation. This higher average wage markup moves the economy further from the first best alloca-
tion, increasing the threat of indeterminacy. Trend growth simply increases the severity of these
monopolistic distorsions.
These results lead to another question: Is there an alternative to the mixed rule that more
safely achieves determinacy? To answer this question, we first remove output growth from the
policy rule with interest rate responding to the output gap. We find that the conditions leading to
(in)determinacy closely mimic those under the mixed rule.
Things are sharply different when we shut down the reaction to the output gap, leaving only
that to output growth. We find that the policy rule more safely guarantees a unique REE than
the mixed rule does, and it does so by a significant margin. That is, a policy rule reacting to
output growth ensures determinacy for a much larger set of policy responses to inflation. Whether
the model accounts or not for working capital, the minimum response of interest rates to inflation
consistent with determinacy is 1 whether trend inflation is 0, 2% or 3%. The value of αpi consistent
with determinacy is therefore significantly smaller under the growth rule.
Why reacting to output growth rather than to output gap helps achieving a state of deter-
minacy under low trend inflation? In the textbook NK sticky-price model, and hence according
to conventional stabilization, lowering interest rates when output is below potential is what the
monetary authority is expected to do. Our different results obtained under a policy rule reacting
to output growth follows from the natural rate property of the model. That is, when the level of
output is below potential, output growth tends to be high, calling for higher, not lower, interest
rates which better ensures a unique REE. Thus, the larger the missallocation in the model that
caused by the deviation from the flexible price output, the greater the tension in the two opposing
forces in the policy rule: output gap vs output growth.
Relative to the standard NK model, our MSNK model implies stronger monopolistic distortions
in the steady state, the most important arising from the interaction between trend inflation, sticky
wages and trend growth. The stronger distortions take the economy farther away in the steady
state from the efficient level of output entering the output gap. This in turn calls for a more
aggressive reaction to inflation as suggested by our findings. Of the two opposing influences on
interest rates, that of the output gap or output growth, we find that the impact of output gap is
disproportionally large relative to that of output growth. This explains why under the mixed rule
or a rule reacting only to output gap, determinacy requires a much stronger response to inflation.
By the same token, this is also why a rule incorporating output growth only widens the range of
inflation responses consistent with determinacy.
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We show that our main results are robust to varying the degrees of nominal rigidities in some
acceptable range. Lowering the Calvo probability of non-reoptimized prices from 2/3 to 0.55 as
assumed by Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2011) does not affect our findings obtained under the
mixed rule. Increasing the Calvo probability of non-reoptimized wages from 2/3 to 3/4 to be more
consistent with the evidence in Barattieri, Basu, and Gottschalk (2014) has a negligible impact on
findings with a policy rule reacting to output growth only.
A final question is how our results are affected if we use the post-1982 estimates of the mixed rule
of Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2011)? Based on a sticky-price model without capital accumulation
including firm-specific labor and non-stationary neutral technological progress, these authors offer
evidence suggesting that determinacy was achieved after 1982 through a combination of a lower
trend inflation (3%) and a “hawkish” policy stance. This turns out to not be the case in our baseline
model. Remarkably, with their post-1982 estimates of the mixed rule, our baseline model implies
an indeterminate state. The main reason for this apparently surprising result is that, although
the coefficient on output growth in the Coibion-Gorodnichenko rule is much larger at 2.21 than
the coefficient on the output gap at 0.44 after 1982, the impact of output gap on the prospect
of indeterminacy is disproportionately large relative to that of output growth as we have stressed
above.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our model. Section 3 provides
a discussion of our calibration. Section 4 presents and discusses our results under the mixed Taylor
rule. Section 5 presents our findings with a policy rule responding to output growth only. Section
6 looks at the implications of our model for determinacy in the post-1982 era under the mixed
Taylor rule of Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2011). Section 7 discusses related literature. Section 8
contains concluding remarks.
2 The Baseline Model
Our baseline DSGE model employs the Calvo specification of staggered wage and price adjustment
based on the optimizing behavior of monopolistically competitive households and firms. It also
includes other frictions such as consumer habit formation, investment adjustment costs and variable
capital utilization. Real per capita output growth stems from deterministic trend growth in neutral
and investment-specific technological progress.
We add to this relatively standard medium-size New Keynesian model, a cost channel, round-
about production and non-zero steady-state inflation. To close the model, we assume that monetary
policy first obeys the mixed Taylor rule. Next, we use a Taylor rule with a reaction to short-run
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deviations of inflation from target and output growth from steady state. The inflation target is
exogenously fixed.
Note that since our only focus is on (in)determinacy issues under the mixed Taylor rule and
alternative where interest rates react only to output growth for measure of economic activity, we
present a baseline model in its deterministic version.
2.1 Gross Output
Gross output, Xt, is produced by a perfectly competitive firm using a continuum of intermediate
goods, Xjt, j ∈ (0, 1) and the following CES production technology:
Xt =
(∫ 1
0
X
1
1+λp
jt dj
)1+λp
, (1)
where λp is the desired (or steady-state) markup of price over marginal cost for intermediate firms.
Profit maximization and a zero-profit condition for gross output leads to the following downward
sloping demand curve for the jth intermediate good:
Xjt =
(
Pjt
Pt
)− (1+λp)
λp
Xt, (2)
and Pjt is the price of good j, while Pt is the aggregate price index:
Pt =
(∫ 1
0
P
− 1
λp
jt dj
)−λp
. (3)
2.2 Intermediate Goods Producers and Price Setting
A monopolist produces intermediate good j according to the following production function:
Xjt = max
{
gtAΓ
φ
jt
(
KαjtL
1−α
jt
)1−φ −ΥtF, 0} , (4)
where Γjt denotes the intermediate inputs, K̂jt is capital services, Ljt the labor input used by
the jth producer and gA is the gross growth rate of neutral technology. Υ
t represents a growth
factor composed of trend growth in neutral and investment-specific technologies. F is a fixed cost
implying that profits are zero in the steady state and ensuring the existence of balanced growth
path.
The growth factor is given by the composite technological process:
Υt =
(
gtA
) 1
(1−φ)(1−α)
(
gtεI
) α
1−α , (5)
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where gεI is the gross growth rate of investment specific technology.
Without roundabout production, φ = 0 and Υt reverts to the conventional deterministic growth
factor with growth in neutral and investment-specific productivity. From (5), one sees that as φ
gets larger, it amplifies the effects of stochastic growth in neutral productivity on output and its
components. Therefore, for a given level of stochastic growth in neutral productivity, the economy
will grow faster the larger is the share of intermediate inputs in production.
The cost-minimization problem of a typical j firm is:
min
Γt,K̂t,Lt
(1− ψ + ψRt)
(
PtΓjt +R
k
t K̂jt +WtLjt
)
,
subject to:
gtAΓ
φ
jt
(
K̂αjtL
1−α
jt
)1−φ −ΥtF ≥ (Pjt
Pt
)−θ
Xt. (6)
This formulation allows firms to have access to funds borrowed from a financial intermediary at
the beginning of period t to finance a fraction ψ (0 ≤ ψ ≤ 1) of their factor payments, which they
then reimburse at the end of period t at the gross nominal interest rate Rt. R
k
t is the nominal
rental price of capital services K̂jt (the product of utilization, ut, and physical capital, Kt), and Wt
is the nominal wage index.
Defining Ψt ≡ (1 − ψ + ψRt), and then solving the cost-minimization problem yields the real
marginal cost,
mct = φg
t(1−α)(φ−1)
A Ψt
[(
rkt
)α
w
(1−α)
t
]1−φ
, (7)
and the demand functions for the intermediate inputs and primary factor inputs,
Γjt = φ
mct
Ψt
(
Xjt + Υ
tF
)
, (8)
Kjt = α (1− φ) mct
Ψtrkt
(
Xjt + Υ
tF
)
, (9)
Ljt = (1− α)(1− φ) mct
Ψtwt
(
Xjt + Υ
tF
)
, (10)
where φ ≡ φ−φ (1− φ)φ−1
(
α−α (1− α)α−1
)1−φ
, rkt is the real rental price on capital services and
wt is the real wage.
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Intermediate firms allowed to reoptimize their price choose a price P ∗t , and those not allowed
to reoptimize keep their price unchanged. The price-setting rule is hence given by
Pjt =
 P ∗jt with probability 1− ξpPj,t−1 with probability ξp . (11)
When reoptimizing its price, a firm j chooses a price that maximizes the present discounted value
of future profits, subject to (2) and to cost minimization:
max
Pjt
Et
∞∑
t=0
ξspβ
sΛt+s
Λt
[PjtXj,t+s −MCt+sXj,t+s] , (12)
where β is the discount factor, Λt is the marginal utility of nominal income to the representative
household owning the firm, ξsP is the probability that a wage chosen in period t will still be in effect
in period t+ s, and MCt+s is the nominal marginal cost.
Solving the problem yields the following optimal price:
E0
∞∑
s=0
ξspβ
sλrt+sXjt+s
1
λp
(
p∗t
pit+1,t+s
− (1 + λp)mct+s
)
= 0, (13)
where λrt is the marginal utility of an additional unit of real income received by the household,
p∗t =
Pjt
Pt
is the real optimal price and pit+1,t+s =
Pt+s
Pt
is the cumulative inflation rate between t+ 1
and t+ s.
2.3 Households and Wage Setting
There is a continuum of households, indexed by i ∈ [0, 1], who are monopoly suppliers of labor. They
face a downward-sloping demand curve for their particular type of labor given in (18). Each period,
households face a fixed probability, (1 − ξw), that they can reoptimize their nominal wage. As in
Erceg, Henderson, and Levin (2000), utility is separable in consumption and labor. State-contingent
securities insure households against idiosyncratic wage risk arising from staggered wage-setting.
Households are then identical along all dimensions other than labor supply and wages.
The problem of a typical household, omitting dependence on i except for these two dimensions,
is:
max
Ct,Lit,Kt+1,Bt+1,It,Zt
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
(
ln (Ct − hCt−1)− ηLit
1+χ
1 + χ
)
, (14)
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subject to the following budget constraint,
Pt
(
Ct +
It
gt
εI
+
a(ut)Kt−1
gt
εI
)
+
Bt+1
Rt
≤WitLit +Rkt utKt−1 +Bt + Πt + Tt, (15)
and the physical capital accumulation process,
Kt+1 = g
t
εI
(
1− S
(
It
It−1
))
It + (1− δ)Kt. (16)
Ct is real consumption and h is a parameter determining internal habit. Lit denotes hours and
χ is the inverse Frisch labor supply elasticity. It is investment, and a(ut) is a resource cost of
utilization, satisfying a(1) = 0, a′(1) = 0, and a′′(1) > 0. This resource cost is measured in units of
physical capital. Wit is the nominal wage paid to labor of type i, Bt is the stock of nominal bonds
that the household enters the period with. Πt denotes the distributed dividends from firms. Tt is
a lump-sum transfer from the government. S
(
It
It−1
)
is an investment adjustment cost, satisfying
S (.) = 0, S′(.) = 0, and S′′ (.) > 0, δ is the depreciation rate of physical capital.
2.4 Employment Agencies
A large number of competitive employment agencies combine differentiated labor skills into a ho-
mogeneous labor input which is sold to intermediate firms, according to:
Lt =
(∫ 1
0
L
1
1+λw
it di
)1+λw
, (17)
where λw is the desired (or steady-state) markup of wage over the household’s marginal rate of
substitution.
Profit maximization by the perfectly competitive employment agences implies the following
labor demand function:
Lit =
(
Wit
Wt
)− 1+λw
λw
Lt, (18)
where Wit is the wage paid to labor of type i and Wt is the aggregate wage index:
Wt =
(∫ 1
0
W
− 1
λw
it di
)−λw
. (19)
2.5 Wage setting
The wage-setting rule is given by:
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Wit =
 W ∗it with probability 1− ξwWi,t−1 with probability ξw, (20)
where W ∗it is the reset wage. When allowed to reoptimize its wage, the household chooses the
nominal wage that maximizes the present discounted value of flow utility flow (14) subject to
demand schedule (18). From the first-order condition, we the have the following optimal wage rule:
Et
∞∑
s=0
(βξw)
s λ
r
t+sLit+s
λw
[
w∗t
pit+1,t+s
− (1 + λw)
ηLχit+s
λrt+s
]
= 0, (21)
where ξsw is the probability that a wage chosen in period t will still be in effect in period t+ s, and
w∗t is the reset wage denoted in real terms.
2.6 Monetary Policy
We will consider two different monetary policy rules. The first one is the mixed output gap-output
growth rule:
Rt
R
=
(
Rt−1
R
)ρR [(pit
pi
)αpi ( Yt
Y ∗t
)αy ( Yt
Yt−1
g−1Y
)αdy]1−ρR
εrt , (22)
where R is the steady-state nominal interest rate, pit is the rate of inflation in period t, pi is the fixed
inflation target, Y ∗t is the level of output at flexible wages and prices, gY is steady-state output
growth, ρR is a smoothing parameter, and αpi, αy and αdy are control parameters.
The mixed rule implies that the nominal interest rate adjusts in response to deviations of
inflation from target, as well as to the level of the output gap and to deviations of the growth rate
of output in period t from steady-state output growth.5 The output gap is defined as the actual
level of output relative to the level of output under flexible wages and prices. This type of rule has
been widely used in the estimation of medium-scale DSGE models.6
2.7 Market-Clearing and Equilibrium
Market-clearing for capital services, labor, and intermediate inputs requires that
∫ 1
0
K̂jtdj = K̂t,∫ 1
0
Ljtdj = Lt, and
∫ 1
0
Γjtdj = Γt.
5Assuming that output growth depends instead on the rate of change of the output gap has little effect on our
main findings.
6See, for example, Smets and Wouters (2007); Justiniano, Primiceri, and Tambalotti (2010); Justiniano, Primiceri,
and Tambalotti (2011); Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2011); Coibion, Gorodnichenko, and Wieland (2012); Justiniano,
Primiceri, and Tambalotti (2010); Justiniano, Primiceri, and Tambalotti (2011); Khan and Tsoukalas (2011); and
Khan and Tsoukalas (2012), among others. The output growth rule sets αy = 0, so the central bank does not respond
to the output gap.
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Gross output can be written as:
Xt = g
t
AΓ
φ
t
(
Kαt L
1−α
t
)1−φ −ΥtF. (23)
Value added, Yt, is related to gross output, Xt, by
Yt = Xt − Γt, (24)
where Γt denotes total intermediates.
The resource constraint of the economy is:
Yt = Ct +
It
gt
εI
+
a(ut)Kt
gt
εI
. (25)
3 Calibration
The calibration for our simulations is explained as follows. Some parameters are calibrated to
conventional long-run targets in the data, while others are based on the previous literature. The
calibration is summarized in Table 1, with the unit of time being a quarter. Some parameter values
like β = 0.99, b = 0.8, η = 6, χ = 1, δ = 0.025 and α = 0.33 are standard in the literature and
require no explanation.
Other parameters deserve some explanations. The parameter governing the size of investment
adjustment costs is κ = 3, which is slightly higher than the estimate in Christiano, Eichenbaum,
and Evans (2005), but slightly lower than the one in Justiniano, Primiceri, and Tambalotti (2010,
2011). The parameter on the squared term in the utilization adjustment cost is set at γ2 = 0.025,
which is somewhat higher than the value chosen by Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005),
but somewhat lower than the estimate reported by Justiniano, Primiceri, and Tambalotti (2010,
2011).
The values assigned to λp, denoting the steady-state price markup and to λw, denoting the
steady-state wage markup, are such that the desired price and wage markups are 20 percent if
trend inflation is zero, which is consistent with Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) and Huang and
Liu (2002).
Both the Calvo probabilities of wage non-reoptimization, ξw, and price non-reoptimization, ξp,
are set at 2/3; this implies an average waiting time between wage and price changes of 9 months.
These values are not far from the estimates reported by Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005)
for their one-shock model and by Smets and Wouters (2007) for their multi-shock model. Evidence
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on the frequency of price adjustments using disaggregated consumer price data by Bils and Klenow
(2004) suggests a median (as opposed to average) waiting time of price adjustments of about 5.1
months. The evidence in Nakamura and Steinsson (2008) is more consistent with our calibration
of ξp since they report a range for the average frequency of price changes between 7 and 11 months
depending on the price categories on which their evidence is based. Evidence from disaggregated
wage data presented in Barattieri, Basu, and Gottschalk (2014) implies a higher degree of wage
stickiness than assumed here, between 12 and 15 months. Thus, we view as conservative our
baseline values of ξp and ξw.
Given that the next section will search for values of αpi consistent with a unique REE, the only
parameters that need to be calibrated in the mixed Taylor rule are ρr, the interest rate smoothing
parameter which is set at 0.8, αy, the coefficient on the output gap set at 0.2, and αdy, the coefficient
on output growth also set at 0.2. These are relatively standard values in the literature when using
in the estimation U.S. postwar data dating back to the 1950s and 1960s. When the central bank
responds to output growth but not to the output gap, αy = 0. When simulating the model, we
assume that the steady-state gross inflation target is fixed and set at an annualized average rate of
inflation of 0, 2% or 3%.
Our model also accounts for real per capita output growth. Mapping the model to the data, the
trend growth rate of the IST term, gεI , equals the negative of the growth rate of the relative price
of investment goods. To measure this in the data, we define investment as expenditures on new
durables plus private fixed investment, and consumption as consumer expenditures of nondurables
and services. These series are from the BEA and cover the period 1960:I-2007:III, to leave out the
financial crisis.7 The relative price of investment is the ratio of the implied price index for investment
goods to the price index for consumption goods. The average growth rate of the relative price from
the period 1960:I-2007:III is -0.00472, so that gεI = 1.00472. Real per capita GDP is computed
by subtracting the log civilian non-institutionalized population from the log-level of real GDP. The
average growth rate of the resulting output per capita series over the period is 0.005712, so that
gY = 1.005712 or 2.28 percent a year. Given the calibrated growth of IST from the relative price
investment data (gεI = 1.0047), we then pick g
1−φ
A to generate the appropriate average growth rate
of output. This implies g1−φA = 1.0022 or a measured growth rate of TFP of about 1 percent per
year.
The parameter ψ measures the fraction of factor payments financed by working capital. Al-
though some evidence confirms the existence of a cost channel (Ravenna and Walsh, 2006; Chris-
tiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans, 2005; Chowdhury, Hoffmann, and Schabert, 2006; Tillman, 2009),
7See Ascari, Phaneuf, and Sims (2018) for a detailed description of how these data are constructed.
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we do not dispose of evidence on the fraction of factor payments financed by working capital. For
this reason, in our model simulations, we alternatively set ψ = 0 (no working capital), 1/2 or 1. The
parameter φ, measuring the share of payments to intermediate inputs in total production, is set at
φ = 0.5 following Basu (1995), Dotsey and King (2006) and Christiano, Trabandt, and Walentin
(2011).
4 Rule-Based Monetary Policy and the Threat of Indeterminacy
Using the baseline model described in Section 2, we identify in this section the conditions leading to
(in)determinacy with the central bank first setting interest rates conditioned on the mixed Taylor
rule. Next, we look at a Taylor rule reacting only to output growth and no response to the output
gap. Specifically, we search for values of αpi consistent with determinacy in our baseline framework
and some alternative models with fewer theoretical ingredients.
4.1 The Mixed Taylor Rule and the Prospect of Indeterminacy
This subsection addresses the following question: What are the values of αpi consistent with de-
terminacy if monetary policy is set in accordance with the mixed Taylor rule? To answer this
question, we use the baseline model proposed in Section 2. While doing so, parameters other than
αpi keep the values we have assigned them in our calibration. Table 2 displays the values of αpi
consistent with determinacy for an inflation trend of 0, 2% and 3% (annualized), and a fraction of
factor payments financed by working capital of 0, 1/2 and 1.
A first thing to note is that with a trend inflation of 0 and no working capital (ψ = 0), achieving
a unique REE requires that αpi ≥ 1.3. That is, strict application of the Taylor Principle (αpi > 1)
no more guarantees determinacy. With 0 trend inflation and a fraction of factor payments financed
via intra-period loans set at 1/2, determinacy is achieved only if αpi belongs to the interval [1.6, 4.2].
In the extreme case where ψ = 1, we find no value of αpi consistent with determinacy whether trend
inflation is 0, 2% or 3%.
Non-zero trend inflation has two main effects. First, it increases the minimum value of αpi
consistent with determinacy. With ψ = 0, the value of αpi consistent with determinacy rises to
1.9 with 2% trend inflation and to 2.5 with 3% trend. Second, when combined with ψ = 1/2, a
2% inflation trend results in a smaller interval consistent with determinacy, that is αpi  [2.3, 4.2].
With 3% trend inflation, the interval narrows to [2.9, 4.1]. Therefore, the values of αpi consistent
with a unique REE significantly deviate from the Taylor principle as trend inflation is only mildly
positive.
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These findings are of interest in light of estimates of αpi found in the broader literature using
U.S. data dating back to the 1950s and 1960s (Smets and Wouters, 2007; Justiniano, Primiceri, and
Tambalotti, 2010, 2011; Khan and Tsoukalas, 2011, 2012). These MSNK models incorporate the
mixed Taylor rule and indexation, but abstract from working capital and roundabout production.
With indexation, nominal wages and prices are indexed to past and steady-state inflation in a way
that neutralizes the impact of non-zero trend inflation on (in)determinacy. These estimates range
from 1.7 to 2.1. Based on the simulation results we have presented so far, these estimates would be
consistent with determinacy if: i) ψ = 0 and trend inflation was less than 2% or ii) ψ = 1/2 and
trend inflation was 0.
4.2 Factors Driving Indeterminacy Under the Mixed Rule
At this stage, a question that arises naturally is the following: What are the key factors driving our
indeterminacy results at fairly low rates of trend inflation under the mixed Taylor rule? To answer
this question, we consider different model ingredients and how they impact our results. The results
of these exercises are reported in Table 3, which is similar to Table 2, but shuts off different model
features to isolate their roles. We focus on five scenarios.
Panel (i) considers the case where nominal wages are flexible by setting ξw = 0. With 0 trend
inflation and no working capital (ψ = 0), αpi ≥ 1 is sufficient to ensure determinacy relative to
αpi ≥ 1.3 with sticky wages. With a trend inflation of 2%, αpi ≥ 1.1 will be consistent with
determinacy compared to αpi ≥ 1.9 with sticky wages, while with 3% trend inflation, αpi ≥ 1.3 is
needed relative to αpi ≥ 2.5 with sticky wages. With ψ = 1/2 and 0 trend inflation, it must be that
αpi  [1.3, 4.2] for determinacy. With a 2% or 3% trend inflation, αpi must be in the interval [1.4, 4.2].
This means that with 2% trend inflation, the lower bound on αpi consistent with determinacy is
1.64 times higher with sticky wages than with flexible wages, whereas with a 3% trend, it is 2.1
times higher. In the extreme case where all input costs are fully financed by working capital, there
is no single value of αpi consistent with a unique REE.
Panel (ii) looks at the case where economic growth is shut off from our baseline model. For this,
we set the trend growth rates of IST and neutral productivity to zero. The impact of economic
growth on our results is significant. With ψ = 0 and a trend inflation of 0, αpi ≥ 1 is sufficient to
achieve determinacy in the no growth scenario, while with 2% and 3% trend inflation, αpi ≥ 1.4
and αpi ≥ 1.6 are required for determinacy. With ψ = 1/2 and a trend inflation of 0, αpi must be in
the interval [1.2, 4.4]. With 2% trend inflation, αpi must be found in the interval [1.6, 4.3], meaning
that the lower bound consistent with determinacy is 1.44 times higher with economic growth. With
3% trend inflation, αpi  [2.0, 4.3], which implies that the lower bound consistent with determinacy
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is 1.45 times higher with trend growth. With ψ = 1 and 0 trend inflation, determinacy is obtained
only if αpi  [1.5, 1.8]. With a trend inflation of 2% or 3%, there is no value of αpi achieving
determinacy.
Panel (iii) shows the results assuming flexible nominal wages and no trend growth. With ψ = 0,
determinacy is achieved for αpi ≥ 1 with 0 trend inflation, αpi ≥ 1.1 with 2% trend inflation and
αpi ≥ 1.3 with 3% trend inflation. With ψ = 1/2, αpi must be in the interval [1.3, 1.8] with
a trend inflation of 0, αpi  [1.4, 4.3] with 2% trend and αpi  [1.4, 4.2] with 3% trend. With
ψ = 1, the intervals consistent with determinacy are [1.5, 4.4] and [1.6, 1.8] with 0 and 2% trend
inflation, respectively. With ψ = 1 and a 3% inflation trend, there is no value of αpi consistent with
determinacy. Therefore, for values of αpi like those typically found in the literature, determinacy will
normally be achieved if nominal wages are flexible and there is no economic growth. These results
hence confirm that sticky wages and trend growth are the two key factors driving the prospect of
(in)determinacy in our baseline model.
Panel (iv) reports the results of a case where working capital and roundabout production are
both omitted from the model (ψ = 0, φ = 0). With 0 trend inflation, αpi ≥ 1.3 is sufficient to
ensure determinacy as in our baseline model. With 2% trend inflation, determinacy is achieved if
αpi ≥ 1.8 compared to 1.9 in our baseline. With 3% trend inflation, αpi ≥ 2.3 will be sufficient for
determinacy relative to 2.5 in our baseline. These results can also be compared with those from
our baseline model where ψ = 1/2 and 1. Recall that with ψ = 1/2, αpi must be in the intervals
[1.6, 4.2], [2.3, 4.2] and [2.9, 4.1] for a trend inflation of 0, 2% and 3%, respectively. With ψ = 1, we
found no single value of αpi generating a unique REE in our baseline model. Therefore, working
capital and roundabout production, two features emphasized by Christiano et al. (2011), contribute
non trivially to the threat of indeterminacy under the mixed Taylor rule although they are not the
key factors driving our results.
Panel (v) considers a fifth case in which nominal wages are flexible, there is no economic
growth, no working capital and no roundabout production. The resulting model is a NK price-
setting framework augmented with capital accummulation and real frictions. With ψ = 0 and a
trend inflation of 0, the minimum value needed for determinacy is αpi ≥ 1. With 2% and 3% trend
inflation, the necessary condition for determinacy is αpi ≥ 1.1. With ψ = 1/2, the corresponding
figures are 1.1 and 1.2. With ψ = 1, αpi  [1.3, 6] will be consistent with determinacy, and this
whether trend inflation is 0, 2% or 3%. Therefore, based on this augmented version of the standard
sticky-price model, determinacy should be safely achieved for values equjal to postwar estimates of
the mixed Taylor rule generally found in the literature.
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To summarize the results presented in this section, we have shown that under the mixed Taylor
rule, the threat of indeterminacy can be real at low rates of trend inflation of 2% and 3%. This is
true when assuming that a moderate fraction of factor payments is financed by intra-period loans
or that all input costs are fully financed by working capital (ψ = 1). Then, the minimum value
of αpi consistent with determinacy is significantly higher than those typically found in estimated
MSNK models for the U.S. postwar period.
Next, we have identified the key factors driving our new results. We have shown that sticky
wages and trend growth in neutral and investment-specific technological progress are the main
factors generating our results if the extent of working capital is moderate. When we abstract from
sticky wages and trend growth, there is a serious threat to determinacy only if trend inflation
reaches 3% and factor payments are fully financed by working capital. Finally, in a sticky-price
model without working capital, roundabout production and economic growth, the prospect of
indeterminacy at low rates of trend inflation vanishes in light of postwar estimates of the mixed
policy rule generally reported in the literature.
5 Policy Rule Responding to Output Growth
The mixed Taylor rule involving responses of the nominal interest rate both to the level of output
gap and to output growth, we now ask which of responding to output gap or output growth matters
most for our findings.
5.1 Output Gap vs Output Growth in the Taylor Rule
We ask whether responding to the level of output gap or to output growth has the strongest impact
on the minimum values of αpi consistent with determinacy. Table 4 compares αpis consistent with
determinacy in three versions of our baseline model that differ only from the specification of the
Taylor rule assumed in the simulations. Panel (i) reports the results assuming the mixed Taylor
rule with a reaction to output gap and output growth. Panel (ii) presents the results with the policy
rule responding to output gap only. Panel (iii) displays the results with the policy rule responding
to output growth only.
Looking at this table, what is striking is the high similarity of results obtained under the mixed
Taylor rule and a policy rule reacting only to output gap. To a first-order approximation, the
results with the output gap closely mimic those obtained under the mixed Taylor rule. Next, we
ask how our findings are affected when interest rates react only to output growth. We find that
the conditions leading to determinacy are markedly different from those obtained under the mixed
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policy rule. Without working capital (ψ = 0), αpi ≥ 1 guarantees a unique REE whether trend
inflation is 0, 2% or 3%. With a fraction of factor payments financed by working capital set at
ψ = 1/2, αpi  [1, 4.2] safely guarantees determinacy. Finally, in the extreme case where ψ = 1,
determinacy is achieved if αpi  [1, 1.8] under 0 trend inflation. With an inflation trend of 2% and
3%, the interval consistent with determinacy is [1, 1.7].
What do we learn about rules-based monetary policy from these findings? First, the mixed
Taylor rule widely used recently in the estimation of MSNK models represents a serious threat to
determinacy at a low level of trend inflation seen through the lens of our baseline model. Second,
when looking at whether reacting to the output gap or to output growth drives our indeterminacy
results under the mixed rule, we have found that responding to output gap has a disproportionally
large impact on our determinacy results relative to output growth. Third, our findings suggest that
a policy rule reacting only to output growth considerably widens the range of αpi-values consistent
with determinacy.
5.2 Varying the Degrees of Nominal Rigidities
Our baseline calibration has set the Calvo probabilities of wage and price non-reoptimization at
ξp = ξw = 2/3. However, micro level evidence on the frequency of price adjustments by Bils and
Klenow (2004) suggests that the probability of price non-reoptimization is somewhat lower. Coibion
and Gorodnichenko (2011) and Coibion, Gorodnichenko, and Wieland (2012) set ξp = 0.55. On the
other hand, micro level evidence on the frequency of wage adjustments by Barattieri, Basu, and
Gottschalk (2014) implies a somewhat higher probability of wage non-reoptimization between 0.75
and 0.8.
Table 5 presents the results of two experiments. The first experiment (Panel i) looks at the
prospect of indeterminacy under the mixed Taylor rule for ξp = 0.55. The second experiment
(Panel ii) revisits the conditions leading to determinacy under a policy rule reacting to output
growth with ξw = 3/4. Lowering ξp from 2/3 to 0.55 essentially has no impact on the conditions
ensuring determinacy in our baseline model under the mixed rule. The same is true when increasing
ξw from 2/3 to 3/4 and assuming that the Taylor rule reacts to output growth only in our baseline
model.
6 The Mixed Rule and Indeterminacy After 1982
This section asks the following question: What if we take into account post-1982 estimates of the
mixed rule? In the literature, evidence covering subsample periods has been mixed. For instance,
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using a Bayesian procedure, Smets and Wouters (2007) find no evidence of significant variations in
the estimates of the mixed Taylor rule from 1966:II-1979:II to 1984:I-2004:IV. As a matter of fact,
their subsample estimates are relatively similar to parameter values of the mixed rule assumed by
our baseline calibration. Therefore, using their subsample estimates have no significant impact on
the results we have reported.
By contrast, Clarida, Gal´ı, and Gertler (2000) report significant variations in the estimates of
the control parameters of a Taylor rule when moving from 1960:I-1979:II to 1979:II-1996:II. Their
evidence suggests monetary policy was significantly less “accommodative” of shocks after 1979:II.
Unlike the mixed Taylor rule in our baseline model, Coibion, Gorodnichenko, and Wieland
(2012) estimate a rule allowing for interest smoothing of order two of the form:
Rt
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They report significant changes in the estimates of the mixed Taylor rule from 1969-1978 to 1983-
2002. They report an estimate of αpi of 0.79 prior to 1979 and 1.58 after 1982. The estimate of αy
is 0.48 and 0.44, respectively, while that of αdy is 0.04 and 2.21. Therefore, in the years following
1982, the coefficient on inflation has been two times its pre-1979 value. Meanwhile, the coefficient
on output growth has surged from 0.04 prior to 1979 to 2.21 after 1982. Therefore, it has been
much bigger than the coefficient on the output gap. Meanwhile, the smoothing parameters prior
to 1979 are ρ1 = 1.39 and ρ2 = −0.49, and those after 1982, ρ1 = 1.12 and ρ2 = −0.18. Based on
their estimates of the mixed rule, in particular on the much stronger responses of interest rates to
inflation and output growth, CG have referred to pre-1979 monetary policy as ““dovish” and to
post-1982 policy as ““hawkish”.
Table 6 reports the results of an experiment where we use in our baseline model the post-1982
CG estimates of the mixed policy rule, except the coefficient on inflation we are searching for. The
rest of the parameters keep the values assigned by our calibration. What is striking about these
results is that determinacy seems more difficult to achieve under the post-1982 CG rule. Under 0
trend inflation and no working capital (ψ = 0), αpi ≥ 1.7 is consistent with determinacy compared
to αpi ≥ 1.3 conditioned on our baseline calibration. With positive trend inflation, the minimum
requirement on αpi to achieve determinacy increases. With 2% trend inflation it rises to αpi ≥ 3.1,
and with 3% trend inflation it increases to αpi ≥ 3.9. CG report an estimate of αpi which is 1.58
assuming a level of trend inflation of 3%.
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Now, if ψ = 1/2, αpi must belong to the intervals [2.3, 18.1], [3.6, 18] and [4.5, 17.9] for an
inflation of 0, 2% and 3%, respectively. In the case where the cost of all inputs is financed via intra-
period loans (ψ = 1), these intervals become [2.9, 7.6], [4.2, 7.6] and [5.3, 7.6], respectively. What
emerges for these findings, is that the minimum requirement on αpi consistent with determinacy is
significantly higher when we use the estimates of CG.
Recall we have shown conditioned on our baseline calibration that the conditions leading to
determinacy with a policy rule reacting to the output gap closely mimic those under the mixed
policy rule. CG obtain an estimate of the response to the output gap which is significantly stronger
than our baseline (0.44 vs 0.2). As a result, the minimum requirement on αpi to achieve deter-
minacy is significantly higher since the impact of the output gap on the prospect of determinacy
is disproportionally large relative to that of output growth as we have seen previously, and this
despite the fact that the response to inflation was much stronger after 1982.
7 Related Literature
Our findings have so far suggested that a policy rule reacting only to output growth leaves the
monetary authority with significantly more room to achieve a unique REE than a policy rule
responding to the level of the output gap and to output growth or to the output gap only. Some
reasons have been advanced in the literature as to why targeting the growth rate of output might
be preferred to targeting the level of the output gap. Walsh (2003), for one, argues it is unclear
that stabilizing inflation and the level of the output gap are objectives that central banks actually
or should pursue. He provides some evidence, based on the standard NKPC model, that a policy
aimed at stabilizing inflation and the rate of change of output imparts inertia that possibly improves
stabilization relative to pure discretion or inflation targeting.
Ascari and Ropele (2009) highlight the potentially destabilizing role of a policy rule reacting to
the level of the output gap under positive trend inflation in a standard sticky-price model without
capital accumulation. Here, using a sticky-price model with capital accumulation and real frictions
that abstracts from other theoretical refinements, we have presented evidence that a policy rule
reacting both to the level of the output gap and to output growth does not represent a serious
threat to determinacy for a level of trend inflation of 3% or less. We have shown that such a model
calls for a reaction of interest rates to inflation that represents only a small departure from the
Taylor principle.
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Coibion, Gorodnichenko, and Wieland (2012) show that a policy rule responding to the growth
rate of output as opposed to the level of the output gap, can help restore determinacy for plau-
sible inflation responses. They reach this conclusion using a sticky-price model without capital
accumulation that includes firm-specific labor and non-stationary neutral technological progress.
Next, they combine the level of the output gap and output growth into a Taylor rule estimated
from a subsample of data from 1983 to 2002. Given their estimates of the mixed Taylor rule and
a percentage of trend inflation of 3% or 6%, they draw 10,000 times from the distribution of the
estimated parameters and assess the fraction of draws that yield a determinate REE for a given
level of trend inflation. They find that conditioned on their mixed Taylor rule, more than 99 percent
of the empirical distribution of parameters yields determinacy at a level of trend inflation of 3% in
the post-1982 period.8 Contrasting sharply with their findings, we find according to our baseline
model that their estimates of the mixed Taylor rule are not consistent with determinacy for a level
of trend inflation of 3%.
Sims (2013) explores which measure of economic activity targeted by the monetary authority
would be more beneficial to welfare. He uses a standard MSNK model abstracting from working
capital and roundabout production. He shows that a policy rule reacting to output growth is
welfare enhancing relative to a rule responding to the level of the output gap.
Using a Bayesian procedure, Arias et al. (2017) estimate a MSNK model embedding a mixed
Taylor rule as in Coibion, Gorodnichenko, and Wieland (2012). The estimation is fitted to the Great
Moderation. They find that for moderate inflation targets between 2% and 4%, the probability
of determinacy is near unity conditioned on the mixed rule. However, this probability somewhat
drops conditional on model-free estimates of the monetary policy rule based on real-time data.
Hirose, Kurozumi, and Zandweghe (2017) estimate a sticky-price model without capital accu-
mulation where non-zero steady-state inflation plays an active role. In their preferred model, a
fraction of price-setting firms behave as ”rule-thumbers” following Gal´ı and Gertler (1999), setting
prices when allowed to change to the last quarter’s rate of inflation. Using the mixed Taylor rule,
they report that the response of interest rates to inflation was weakly active in the pre-1979 period
(coefficient of 1.03) and much more active in the post-1982 period (coefficient of 2.73). Based
on their estimated model, they establish the probability of indeterminacy to be nearly one in the
pre-1979 period and nearly 0 in the post-1982 period.
8They even find that with the estimated post-1982 policy reaction function and a trend inflation of 6%, the
fraction of draws consistent with determinacy in the post-1982 period is 62.2%.
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8 Conclusion
Is the prospect of determinacy affected when trend inflation is increased from 2% to 3-4% while the
Fed concomitantly returns to a rules-based monetary policy? Until now, the answer offered by the
broad literature was that a trend inflation of 4% or less does not pose a real threat to determinacy.
In contrast to conventional wisdom, we have shown that conditioned on a Taylor rule popularized
by Smets and Wouters (2007), which has been widely used afterwards in the estimation of MSNK
models, an inflation trend of only 2% represents a threat to determinacy according to the model
we have proposed in this paper. The policy rule responsible for this apparently surprising result is
one where the nominal interest rate reacts to inflation, to the level of the output gap and to output
growth.
Given the results we have presented, three questions may come to mind. First, why is it that
these results went remarkably overlooked in the literature? Second, knowing that inflation has
averaged 3.52% during the postwar period and 2.2% after 1990, was the U.S. economy always in a
state of indeterminacy during the postwar period with the Fed running monetary policy based on
the mixed Taylor rule? Or alternatively, would it be possible that the U.S. economy was never in a
state of indeterminacy during the postwar period with the Fed following a Taylor rule responding
only to output growth?
Our answer to the first question is the following. There are presumably two reasons why our
results went overlooked in the literature. The first reason is that MSNK models have generally
assumed automatic quarterly indexation of non-reoptimized nominal wages and prices to past and
long-run inflation that more or less neutralizes the impact of steady-state inflation on the prospect
of indeterminacy under the mixed Taylor rule. The second reason, is that this class of models has
also ignored the potential impact of working capital interacting with roundabout production as
emphasized by Christiano, Trabandt, and Walentin (2011) in the context of a simpler NK price-
setting model. Our own results suggest that with a trend inflation of 0, no working capital and no
roundabout production, determinacy can be achieved with a response of interest rates to inflation
not deviating significantly from the Taylor principle even when the central bank sets its policy in
accordance with the mixed Taylor rule.
Our answers to the second and third questions are less clear-cut. For one, we hardly believe
that the U.S. economy has always been in a state of indeterminacy throughout the postwar period
with the Fed using the mixed Taylor rule. If this is the case, another possibility is that the economy
was never in a state of indeterminacy during the postwar period with the Fed setting its policy
from a rule responding only to output growth. This can be verified by bringing to the data versions
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of our model with the mixed Taylor rule and a policy rule reacting only to output growth. Finding,
that the economy was never in a state of indeterminacy during the postwar period would call for a
reassessment of several important questions, including the identification of the sources of the Great
Inflation and Great Moderation. We plan to undertake this task in the near future.
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Table 1: Parameter Values
Parameter Value Description
β 0.99 Discount factor
b 0.8 Internal habit formation
η 6 Labor disutility
χ 1 Frisch elasticity
κ 3 Investment adjustment cost
δ 0.025 Depreciation rate
γ1 Z
∗ = 1 Utilization adjustment cost linear term
γ2 0.025 Utilization adjustment cost squared term
ξp 0.66 Calvo price
ξw 0.66 Calvo wage
λp 0.2 Steady state price mark-up
λw 0.2 Steady state wage mark-up
φ 0.5 Intermediate input share
α 1/3 Capital share
ψ 0, 1/2, 1 Fraction of input financed
ρi 0.8 Taylor rule smoothing
αpi 1.5 Taylor rule inflation
αy 0.2 Taylor rule output growth
αy 0.2 Taylor rule output gap
pi 0, 2, 3 Steady state inflation (annual percentage rate)
gεI 1.0047 Gross growth of investment specific technology
gA 1.0022
1−φ Gross growth of neutral productivity
Note: This table shows the values of the parameters used in quantitative analysis of the model. A description of each
parameter is provided in the right column.
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Table 2: Determinacy and mixed Taylor rule in the baseline model
Fraction of input (ψ)
Trend inflation (pi) 0 1/2 1
0% αpi ≥ 1.3 αpi ∈ [1.6, 4.2] empty set
2% αpi ≥ 1.9 αpi ∈ [2.3, 4.2] empty set
3% αpi ≥ 2.5 αpi ∈ [2.9, 4.1] empty set
Note: This table shows the values of the minimum response of interest rates to deviations of inflation from target
(αpi), which are consistent with determinacy for an inflation trend of 0%, 2% and 3% (annualized), and a fraction of
factor payments financed by working capital of 0, 1/2 and 1.
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Table 3: Determinacy and mixed Taylor rule in alternative models
Panel (i): ξw = 0
Fraction of input (ψ)
Trend inflation (pi) 0 1/2 1
0% αpi ≥ 1.0 αpi ∈ [1.3, 4.2] empty set
2% αpi ≥ 1.1 αpi ∈ [1.4, 4.2] empty set
3% αpi ≥ 1.3 αpi ∈ [1.4, 4.2] empty set
Panel (ii): gz = gυ = 1
Fraction of input (ψ)
Trend inflation (pi) 0 1/2 1
0% αpi ≥ 1.0 αpi ∈ [1.2, 4.4] αpi = [1.5, 1.8]
2% αpi ≥ 1.4 αpi ∈ [1.6, 4.3] empty set
3% αpi ≥ 1.6 αpi ∈ [2.0, 4.3] empty set
Panel (iii): ξw = 0 and gz = gυ = 1
Fraction of input (ψ)
Trend inflation (pi) 0 1/2 1
0% αpi ≥ 1.0 αpi ∈ [1.3, 4.2] αpi ∈ [1.5, 1.8]
2% αpi ≥ 1.1 αpi ∈ [1.4, 4.3] αpi ∈ [1.6, 1.8]
3% αpi ≥ 1.3 αpi ∈ [1.4, 4.2] empty set
Panel (iv): φ = 0
Fraction of input (ψ)
Trend inflation (pi) 0 1/2 1
0% αpi ≥ 1.3 αpi ≥ 1.5 αpi ∈ [1.6, 5.8]
2% αpi ≥ 1.8 αpi ≥ 2.0 αpi ∈ [2.2, 5.7]
3% αpi ≥ 2.3 αpi ≥ 2.5 αpi ∈ [2.6, 5.7]
Panel (v): ξw = 0, gz = gυ = 1, φ = 0
Fraction of input (ψ)
Trend inflation (pi) 0 1/2 1
0% αpi ≥ 1.0 αpi ≥ 1.1 αpi ∈ [1.3, 6.0]
2% αpi ≥ 1.1 αpi ≥ 1.2 αpi ∈ [1.3, 6.0]
3% αpi ≥ 1.1 αpi ≥ 1.2 αpi ∈ [1.3, 6.0]
Note: This table shows the values of the minimum response of interest rates to deviations of inflation from target
(αpi), which are consistent with determinacy for an inflation trend of 0%, 2% and 3% (annualized), and a fraction of
factor payments financed by working capital of 0, 1/2 and 1 in alternative models.
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Table 4: Determinacy: output gap vs output growth
Panel (i): gap and growth
Fraction of input (ψ)
Trend inflation (pi) 0 1/2 1
0% αpi ≥ 1.3 αpi ∈ [1.6, 4.2] empty set
2% αpi ≥ 1.9 αpi ∈ [2.4, 4.2] empty set
3% αpi ≥ 2.5 αpi ∈ [2.9, 4.1] empty set
Panel (ii): gap only
Fraction of input (ψ)
Trend inflation (pi) 0 1/2 1
0% αpi ≥ 1.3 αpi ∈ [1.6, 4.2] empty set
2% αpi ≥ 1.9 αpi ∈ [2.4, 4.1] empty set
3% αpi ≥ 2.6 αpi ∈ [3.0, 4.1] empty set
Panel (iii): growth only
Fraction of input (ψ)
Trend inflation (pi) 0 1/2 1
0% αpi ≥ 1.0 αpi ∈ [1.0, 4.2] αpi ∈ [1.0, 2.3]
2% αpi ≥ 1.0 αpi ∈ [1.0, 4.2] αpi ∈ [1.0, 2.3]
3% αpi ≥ 1.0 αpi ∈ [1.0, 4.2] αpi ∈ [1.0, 2.3]
Note: This table shows the values of the minimum response of interest rates to deviations of inflation from target
(αpi), which are consistent with determinacy for an inflation trend of 0%, 2% and 3% (annualized), and a fraction of
factor payments financed by working capital of 0, 1/2 and 1 for different specifications of the Taylor rule.
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Table 5: Determinacy for alternative degrees of nominal rigidities
Panel (i): mixed Taylor rule and ξp = 0.55
Fraction of input (ψ)
Trend inflation (pi) 0 1/2 1
0% αpi ≥ 1.3 αpi ∈ [1.6, 4.2] empty set
2% αpi ≥ 1.9 αpi ∈ [2.3, 4.2] empty set
3% αpi ≥ 2.4 αpi ∈ [2.8, 4.2] empty set
Panel (ii): policy rule reacting to output growth and ξw = 0.75
Fraction of input (ψ)
Trend inflation (pi) 0 1/2 1
0% αpi ≥ 1.0 αpi ∈ [1.0, 4.2] αpi ∈ [1.0, 1.8]
2% αpi ≥ 1.1 αpi ∈ [1.1, 4.2] αpi ∈ [1.0, 1.7]
3% αpi ≥ 1.1 αpi ∈ [1.1, 4.2] αpi ∈ [1.0, 1.7]
Note: This table shows the values of the minimum response of interest rates to deviations of inflation from target
(αpi), which are consistent with determinacy for an inflation trend of 0%, 2% and 3% (annualized), and a fraction of
factor payments financed by working capital of 0, 1/2 and 1 for alternative degrees of nominal rigidities.
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Table 6: Determinacy under Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2011) policy rule
Fraction of input (ψ)
Trend inflation (pi) 0 1/2 1
0% αpi ≥ 1.7 αpi ∈ [2.3, 18.1] αpi ∈ [2.9, 7.6]
2% αpi ≥ 3.1 αpi ∈ [3.6, 18.0] αpi ∈ [4.2, 7.6]
3% αpi ≥ 3.9 αpi ∈ [4.5, 17.9] αpi ∈ [5.3, 7.6]
Note: This table shows the values of the minimum response of interest rates to deviations of inflation from target
(αpi), which are consistent with determinacy for an inflation trend of 0%, 2% and 3% (annualized), and a fraction of
factor payments financed by working capital of 0, 1/2 under Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2011) policy rule.
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